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The Impact of Disclosure Reform and Alternative Sources of Earnings-Related 
Information on the Market Reaction to Firm-Based Earnings-Related Disclosures 
 
Abstract 
Our study seeks to investigate changes in the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures 
following the introduction of the New Zealand continuous disclosure reform. We further 
extend to study whether these changes are different when there exist the alternative sources of 
earnings-related information. Using the sample of 580 earnings forecasts and 626 earnings 
announcements released by 94 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange during the financial 
reporting periods ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005, we find evidence that 
the introduction of the disclosure reform has impacted to the market reaction to earnings-
related disclosures and the availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information 
plays an important role in shaping this impact. Specifically, the market places less emphasis 
on post-disclosure reform management earnings forecasts issued by firms of which the 
alternative sources of earnings-related information are available. There is a significant 
reduction in the market reaction to earnings announcements in the post-disclosure reform 
period. This reduction is mainly driven by group of earnings announcements issued by firms 
of which the alternative sources of earnings-related information are not available. These 
findings suggest that while the enhancement of disclosure regulation in New Zealand is 
considered to have some positive impact on the financial environment which is consistent 
with regulatory intent, the regulators should be aware that the benefits from this disclosure 
regulation may not be universal and thus the increase in compliance costs borne by all firms 




New Zealand has introduced statutory backing for the New Zealand Exchange’s (NZX) 
continuous disclosure listing rules from 1 December 2002, which requires listed firms to 
disclose material information to the capital market as soon as they arise in order to promote 
the efficiency and integrity of the capital market (Securities Markets Amendment Act, 2002). 
Early work on this disclosure reform by Poskitt and Yang (2006), Frijns et al. (2008), Huang 
et al. (2009) and Dunstan et al. (2010) collectively identifies a range of impacts of the 
disclosure reform including changes in capital market characteristics and corporate disclosure 
behaviour. The dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, the market reaction to earnings 
announcements and the information component of the bid-ask spread for less liquid stocks all 
decreased following the enforcement of the disclosure reform (Frijns et al., 2008; Huang et 
al., 2009). According to Huang et al. (2009), firms increased the number of price-sensitive 
disclosures released to the market and improved the timeliness of their earnings 
announcements. Focusing on management earnings forecasts, Dunstan et al. (2010) provide 
strong evidence that there have been significant changes in the likelihood, frequency and 
qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts in the post-disclosure reform 
period. Specifically, there has been an increase in the likelihood that firms issue an earnings 
forecast (overall and non-routine), the frequency of earnings forecasts issued by firms (overall 
and non-routine), and precision and the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
However, despite the broad scope adopted  in Poskitt and Yang (2006), Frijns et al. (2008) 
and Huang et al. (2009), none of these studies investigate the role of alternative sources of 
earnings-related information and the importance of management earnings forecasts while 
examining the disclosure reform’s impact on general capital market characteristics. Also, 
although Dunstan et al. (2010) find significant changes in management earnings forecast 
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behaviour across the disclosure reform, their study has not yet provided any evidence 
documenting whether these incremental changes have had any impact on the general capital 
market characteristics. Collectively, while these findings have provided some evidence about 
the positive impact of the disclosure reform on capital market characteristics and corporate 
disclosure behaviour, we are still not in the position to fully understand how the disclosure 
reform interacting with the alternative sources of earnings-related information has changed 
corporate disclosure behaviour in general and management earnings forecast behaviour in 
particular, which, in turn, has impacted on the market reaction of earnings-related disclosures 
issued by firms and the overall information environment. 
Our study seeks to investigate the impact of this disclosure reform on the market reaction to 
earnings-related disclosures issued by firms. We further investigate whether any impact of 
this disclosure reform on the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures is influenced by 
the availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information. New Zealand provides 
an ideal experimental setting to explore the impact of a possible substitution between firm-
based earnings-related disclosures and those earnings-related disclosures acquired from the 
alternative sources because of the relatively low number of NZX-listed firms being followed 
by active analysts and/or cross-listed in a foreign exchange (Dunstan et al., 2010). Our study 
contributes to this literature in two ways. First, unlike the broad scope adopted by the three 
prior studies on capital market characteristics, we focus specifically on the changes in the 
market reaction to the main earnings-related disclosures issued by firms (i.e. management 
earnings forecasts and earnings announcements) across the disclosure reform. We present a 
detailed empirical analysis of these changes while considering the important role of 
alternative sources of earnings-related information. Second, we add to the prior research 
which analyses the market reaction to earnings announcements by controlling for the presence 
of management earnings forecasts and their accuracy. 
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We examine the changes in the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures (i.e. 
management earnings forecasts and earnings announcements) following the introduction of 
the disclosure reform, using a sample of 580 management earnings forecasts and 626 earnings 
announcements provided by 94 NZX-listed firms during the 31 January 1999 to 31 December 
2005 financial reporting periods. In our analysis, we investigate whether the availability of 
alternative sources of earnings-related information (i.e. analyst coverage and media attention 
as proxied by cross-listing status on a foreign exchange) has had any impact on these changes. 
Our results show that the introduction of the disclosure reform has impacted on the market 
reaction to earnings-related disclosures and the availability of alternative sources of earnings-
related information plays an important role in shaping this impact. Controlling for time-series 
dependency and firm-specific characteristics, we provide some evidence of a smaller market 
reaction around management earnings forecasts and earnings announcements after the 
enforcement of the disclosure reform. Specifically, the market reacts less to management 
earnings forecasts issued by firms which are followed by analysts and/or cross-listed on a 
foreign exchange following the introduction of the disclosure reform. To some extent, these 
findings suggest that the information content of a post-disclosure reform incremental 
management earnings forecast decreased when there exist alternative sources of earnings-
related information. There is a significant reduction in the market reaction to earnings 
announcements in the post-disclosure reform period. This reduction is mainly driven by the 
group of firms which are not followed by analysts and/or cross-listed on a foreign exchange. 
These findings suggest that the positive impact of the disclosure reform in New Zealand on 
the overall information environment just before the release of earnings announcements has 
been restricted to firms which are not followed by analysts and/or not cross-listed on a foreign 
exchange. In other words, the relative benefits of the enforcement of this disclosure reform 
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seem to be less where the alternative sources of earnings-related information are available in 
the capital market. 
The remainder of our study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background to the 
continuous disclosure reform in New Zealand. Section 3 develops the research hypotheses. 
Section 4 presents details about control variables. Section 5 describes the research design. 
Section 6 presents the results and our study concludes in section 7. 
2 Background to the New Zealand Continuous Disclosure Reform 
Prior to 1 December 2002, New Zealand securities law only required firms to provide 
periodic disclosures (the filing of annual reports), episodic disclosures (e.g. the disclosure of 
share dealings by directors), and IPO-related disclosures (Erlenwein, 2003). Listed firms were 
only bound by continuous disclosure obligations under the NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1. Under 
this rule, listed firms had a general obligation to disclose all price-sensitive information 
(relevant information) once the maintenance of confidentiality ceased to have a greater value 
to the issuer concerned than to the public. Like most stock exchanges’ requirements, the NZX 
listing rules are purely contractual provisions that firms accept upon listing. Like other listing 
rules, the NZX had responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with Rule 10.1.1. 
The purely contractual nature of the disclosure obligation led to concerns about the 
effectiveness of Rule 10.1.1. Specifically, the NZX’s enforcement mechanisms were 
considered inadequate, the definition of relevant information was vague, uncertain and broad, 
and the rules were inconsistent with international standards (Erlenwein, 2003). 
The continuous disclosure reform came into force on 1 December 2002 under the Securities 
Markets Amendment Act 2002. It was based on the principle that a strong (statutory-backed) 
continuous disclosure regime would deliver superior outcomes to a rules-based model and as 
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a result, avoid the necessity for costly quarterly reporting.1 The amended Act does not 
prescribe the continuous disclosure requirements applying to listed firms; rather, it provides a 
statutory framework under which the NZX Listing Rule 10.1 operates. The amended Act 
requires a listed firm to make any material information about events or matters available to 
participants in the registered exchange’s market as they arise (the amended Act, Section 19D). 
Thus, the amended Act preserves the autonomy of the NZX through recognising its primary 
responsibility for monitoring its own listing rules. It has also provided an enforcement regime 
to be implemented by either the Securities Commission, with its persecutory role, or any other 
person with an interest in any failure to disclose. The amended Act emphasises investor 
protection through an informed market – a market in which “material information” must be 
released on a timely basis. According to Section 19E, material information is defined as 
information that: 
“A reasonable person would expect, if it were generally available to the market, 
to have a material effect on the price or value of quoted securities of the public 
issuer.” 
Coinciding with the introduction of the amended Act, on 1 December 2002, the NZX 
introduced revised Listing Rule 10.1 to ensure compatibility with the amended Act. The 
revised rule provides that a listed firm should release material information immediately once 
becoming “aware” of it. A listed issuer is deemed to have come into possession of material 
information once a director or executive officer has become aware of it in the course of the 
performance of his or her duties (Listing Rule 10.1.1). The NZX has recognised that there are 
situations where the issuer should legally be allowed to withhold material information. 
                                                 
1 A majority of participants in the New Zealand Securities Commission’s consultation process regarding to 
corporate governance rejected the proposition of mandatory quarterly reporting for three reasons: (1) the 
continuous disclosure regime is sufficient, (2) unnecessary compliance costs, and (3) the risk of entities 
managing short-term earnings (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.57). 
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Although not incorporated into the amended Act, the “carve-out” provisions are a vital part of 
the disclosure reform. According to the provisions, material information does not have to be 
released when: (1) a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed; and 
(2) the information is confidential and its confidentiality is maintained; and (3) it would either 
be illegal to release the information, or it contains an incomplete proposal or negotiation, or 
comprises matters or supposition, or is insufficiently definite, or is for internal management 
only, or is a trade secret. Even if all three criteria are met, a firm can still be required to 
release specific information if it is necessary to prevent the development of a false market in a 
firm’s securities.2 
If an issuer is found to have breached the continuous disclosure provisions, the Securities 
Commission has the power under the amended Act to issue an order requiring the issuer to 
disclose the necessary information and to publish corrective statements at the firm’s expense. 
If the issuer commits a criminal offence in contravention of an order, a fine of up to $30,000 
can be imposed. The Court may also make civil orders requiring disclosure or corrective 
statements, imposing pecuniary penalties of up to $300,000, make compensatory orders, and 
order the payment of the Securities Commission’s costs and expenses. 
3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In a capital market economy, information and agency problems hamper the efficient 
allocation of resources. Among several potential solutions to mitigate these problems are 
regulations which require the full disclosure of all firms’ private information and the demand 
for analysts who engage in uncovering private information about firms and for the media who 
packages and disseminates information as well as creates new information (Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Verrecchia, 2001; Bushee et al., 2009). Given the information and agency problems, 
                                                 
2 A false market is “a market for quoted securities which is materially influenced by false or misleading 
information” (Listing Rule 10.1.1(c)). 
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managers balance conflicting interests in deciding the optimal level of disclosure for their 
firms which may not necessarily be the full disclosure option (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986). 
In the absence of mandatory disclosure regulation, the decision to voluntarily disclose 
information is strategically driven and influenced by the nature of the information held by 
managers, incentives of managers, circumstances of the firms and expected reaction by 
investors, analysts and media to the disclosures. 
Intervention in the form of mandatory disclosure regulation introduces compliance costs and 
leads managers to reassess their disclosure strategies, realigning the optimal level of voluntary 
disclosure with the level of mandatory disclosure for their firms. From the analysts’ 
perspective, this regulatory intervention could potentially change the optimal level of 
information uncovered by analysts. If the optimal level of firms’ voluntary disclosure together 
with firms’ level of mandatory disclosure potentially enables analysts to improve their 
information production process, the demand for analysts could increase and the optimal level 
of information uncovered by analysts could accordingly increase. Alternatively, if the firms’ 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure pre-empts analysts’ information, information to be issued 
by analysts would be less valuable. Accordingly, the demand for analysts and their optimal of 
information supplied would decrease. From the media’s perspective, this regulation 
intervention could also alter the optimal level of information packaged, disseminated and 
created by the media. Similar to the impact of this regulation intervention on the role of 
analysts, the role of media may be more or less valuable. 
From the investors’ perspective, the regulatory intervention could also alter the way investors 
acquire and interpret the information about firms. Investors may find it less costly for them to 
acquire information directly from the firms and rely less on information provided by the 
analysts and/or the media. However, investors may be confused by a flood of information, 
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much of which may not be value relevant to them and rely more on the analysts’ and the 
media’s information. Therefore, it is important from a regulatory perspective to understand 
under what circumstances a mandatory disclosure regulation is effective in providing a 
desirable level of information in order to correct market expectations of the firm’s earnings 
performance and improve the efficiency and integrity of the capital market. 
In the absence of a mandatory requirement for managers to forecast their firms’ earnings, 
management earnings forecasts are important voluntary disclosures providing information 
about expected earnings of a firm. Managers may release earnings forecasts to correct what 
they perceive as an inaccurate market expectation of earnings and consequently influence 
their firms’ stock price (Nagar et al., 2003; Hirst et al., 2008). Prior U.S. studies seek to 
examine whether management earnings forecasts, over which managers have considerable 
discretion about the timing, frequency, precision and accuracy, carry information content 
relevant to the capital market. In fact, there is strong evidence that management earnings 
forecasts are influential on share prices (Patell, 1976; Penman, 1980; Pownall et al., 1993), 
analyst behaviour (Baginski and Hassell, 1990) and the information asymmetry (Coller and 
Yohn, 1997). 
This prior research has not compared the relative informativeness of unregulated and 
regulated management earnings forecasts. The disclosure reform in New Zealand, which 
requires that all price-sensitive information be disclosed immediately to the NZX, provides 
the opportunity to examine whether the disclosure reform has altered investors’ perception of 
management earnings forecasts. If the disclosure reform is effective in prompting managers to 
make timelier and more informative earnings-related announcements, we would expect the 
information surprise associated with each incremental management earnings forecast to be 
lower in the post-disclosure reform period. If this is the case, the magnitude of the market 
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reaction to each individual management earnings forecast will decrease in the post-disclosure 
reform period if the regulation has been effective. Interestingly, if the disclosure reform is 
effective in penalising misleading management earnings forecasts, the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts issued in the post-disclosure reform period could be 
enhanced, leading to a greater market reaction. However, the effectiveness of this disclosure 
reform has been challenged due to the lack of strong enforcement and the difficulty in 
compliance (Dunstan et al., 2010). The disclosure reform may not be coercive enough to force 
managers to reassess their disclosure strategies. If this is the case, there will be no change in 
the magnitude of the market reaction to each individual management earnings forecast. Given 
the ambiguity about how the disclosure reform impacts on management earnings forecast 
behaviour and the market perception of those earnings forecasts, we state our hypothesis 
regarding the magnitude of market reaction management earnings forecasts in the null form. 
H1: There is no change in the market reaction to management earnings forecasts 
in the post-disclosure reform period. 
According to Huang et al. (2009) and Dunstan et al. (2010), firms increased the number of 
price-sensitive disclosures in general, and management earnings forecasts in particular, to the 
capital market after the enforcement of this disclosure reform. However, we have not learnt 
from these studies whether the disclosure reform has altered the overall information set 
available to the capital market. 
The disclosure reform may result in changes in the way in which the capital market becomes 
informed. If the firm becomes a greater information supplier following the disclosure reform, 
we would expect that there would be less return available for the analysts and the media from 
their information production. In other words, if the disclosure reform has impacted on the 
supply of alternative information and created substitution effects then the overall information 
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set available to the capital market will not be altered. If however, the disclosure reform has 
lead to more disclosures but not necessarily better disclosures which may be of little value to 
the analysts, the media and the investors, thus reducing the overall information set available to 
the capital market (Gaynor, 2003). If alternatively, the disclosure reform has resulted in the 
disclosure of extra commentary which makes it easier for the analysts and the media to 
uncover information about firms; we might expect the overall information set to be increased 
in the post-disclosure reform. 
Earnings announcements provide significant information about firms’ earnings performance 
and are found to influence stock prices (Beaver, 1968). However, prior studies show that most 
of the information provided by earnings announcements has been incorporated into stock 
prices via earnings-related pre-announcements (Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver et al., 1980; 
Freeman, 1987). The magnitude of market reaction to earnings announcements will depend on 
how much of the underlying information has already been pre-empted. In other words, the 
magnitude of market reaction to earnings announcement will depend on the overall 
information set available to the capital market before the release of earnings announcements. 
An introduction of a disclosure reform will have an impact on the way in which the market 
reacts to earnings announcements if such disclosure reform has an impact on the overall 
information set immediately before the release of earnings announcements. Due to the 
strength of the opposing views regarding the likely impact of the disclosure reform on the 
overall information set, we state our hypothesis regarding the impact of the disclosure reform 
on the magnitude of market reaction to earnings announcements in the null form. 
H2: There is no change in the market reaction to earnings announcements in the 
post-disclosure reform period. 
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4 Control Variables 
4.1 Analyst Following 
Prior research provides evidence that analysts and investors rely on firms’ disclosures, 
including management earnings forecasts, as a guidance to improve their information 
production process and tend to provide coverage for and invest in firms providing more 
disclosures in general and more earnings forecasts in particular (Hirst et al., 2008). The New 
Zealand environment is characterised by a very low level of analyst following.3 When firms 
are followed by analysts, the way that investors acquire and interpret firms’ information might 
depend on how they perceive the information provided directly from firms compared to the 
information provided by analysts. If investors are comfortable with disclosures issued by 
firms, they might rely less on analysts’ information and thus reacting more strongly to firms’ 
disclosures. However, if investors find disclosures issued by firms not relevant or difficult to 
interpret, they might rely more on analysts’ information and thus reacting less strongly to 
firms’ disclosures. Therefore, it is important to control for analyst following. 
4.2 Cross-listing Status 
According to Baker et al. (2002), firms cross-listed on a foreign exchange experienced a 
significant increase in their visibility in the capital market by getting more attention from both 
analysts and media. Also, firms cross-listed on other foreign exchange could be subjected to 
more onerous disclosure rules which existed prior to the disclosure reform.4 These more 
onerous disclosure rules and their associated litigation risk for non-compliance are likely to 
lead to fewer ad-hoc and low quality disclosures for those firms. Such an expectation is 
                                                 
3 Dunstan et al. (2010) document only 55.38% of their sample firms year being followed by analysts. Huang et 
al. (2009) report only 83 NZX-listed firms are covered by I/B/E/S. 
4 For example, firms cross-listed in the ASX have already subjected to the Australian continuous disclosure 
regime which came into force in 1994 or firms cross-listed in the U.S. have already required to lodge quarterly 
reporting and Form 8-K for certain events. 
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consistent with the findings of Dunstan et al. (2010) who find that cross-listed firms did not 
significantly change their disclosure strategies in the post-disclosure reform period. We, 
therefore, include cross-listing status as a control. 
4.3 Forecast-specific Characteristics 
Most prior studies of the market reaction to management earnings forecasts consistently 
document a greater market reaction to bad news than for good news management earnings 
forecasts. Investor reaction to management earnings forecasts varies depending on the 
confidence in which they have in the quality of the information disclosed. This is driven in 
part by the expectations that investors have about the disclosure motives of firms and their 
assessment of the quality of the information disclosed (Skinner, 1994; Soffer et al., 2000). 
Therefore, we seek to control for the nature of the earnings news. 
Management may release earnings forecasts as part of a routine event such as the chairman’s 
address at the annual general meeting or concurrently with the release of mandatory reports. 
Management may also update the market through the release of a non-routine announcement 
at any time. To some extent, the market would only expect to make non-routine earnings 
forecasts where the benefits of the disclosure are high, thus reacting more strongly to the non-
routine disclosures. Thus, it is important to control for the non-routine nature of the earnings 
forecasts. 
Prior studies also document the impact of other forecast-specific characteristics on the market 
reaction to management earnings forecasts. Baginski et al. (1993) reveal that the market reacts 
more to forecasts with higher levels of precision (i.e. point forecasts carry more information 
content compared to other less precise ones). However, Pownall et al. (1993) and Atiase et al. 
(2005) find that the forecast precision has no impact on the forecasts’ information content. In 
respect of forecast horizon, Pownall et al. (1993) and Ng et al. (2008) confirm that earnings 
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forecasts with shorter horizons are of higher quality and more relevant to the capital market. 
In respect of prior forecast accuracy, Hutton and Stocken (2009) find that the market reacts 
more promptly to both good news and bad news earnings forecasts released by firms with a 
strong reputation for providing accurate forecasts. Given these prior research findings, we 
expect that these qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts in terms of 
forecast precision, forecast horizon and prior forecast accuracy would impact on the market 
reaction; thus, these three forecast-specific characteristics are controlled in the testing 
procedure. 
4.4 Firm-specific Characteristics 
There are also numerous firm-specific factors that are likely to influence the market reaction 
to earnings-related announcements. Prior research has shown that firm-specific attributes such 
as firm performance, firm size and growth opportunities impact the disclosure decision and 
market interpretation of this decision (Atiase et al., 1988; Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; 
Gaver and Gaver, 1993). We, therefore, include these controls in all of our models. 
5 Research Design 
5.1 Study Period and Sample 
The focus of our study is to examine the impact of the New Zealand disclosure reform on 
market reaction to earnings-related disclosures. Our data starts with financial reporting period 
ending on 31 January 1999, the earliest date for which reliable disclosure data is available, 
and extends to the financial reporting period ending on 31 December 2005.5 This gives us 
roughly an eight-year testing period. Our focus is on the population of all NZX-listed firms 
                                                 
5 We have selected a data period up until end of 2005 due to the potential of a further regulatory reform with the 
issue of the Securities Legislation Bill in early 2006. It is possible that the market reaction to earnings-related 
disclosures after this data might be influenced by these potential regulatory changes, rather than being solely 
influenced by the 2002 disclosure reform. 
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that survived at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004. The total 
sample meets this criterion is 94 firms that issued 2650 usable announcements containing 
current or prospective information about earnings over the study period. 720 of these 
announcements contain usable earnings forecasts, among which 580 are bad or good news 
earnings forecasts.6 Our second sample of focus contains a total of 626 usable earnings 
announcements during the same time period. Details of the sample selection procedure are 
provided in Table 1. 
5.2 Data Sources 
The cross-listing status and listing data information are taken directly from the NZX helpline 
service. Earnings and other accounting variables, market capitalisation and market-based data 
are obtained from either the IRG or the Datastream database. All disclosure data are obtained 
from the IRG database. 
5.3 Identification and Coding of Management Earnings Forecasts 
All announcements made over the study period are coded accordingly to the underlying 
(routine or non-routine) events associated with the announcements. Routine event 
announcements are defined as periodic announcements common to all firms required under 
the NZX listing rules or are in common practice. They include announcements containing 
mandatory period reports (quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary and annual reports) and other 
periodic releases associated with repetitive events, including the chairman’s address at the 
annual general meeting, letters to shareholders, and other regular periodic financial updates. 
All other announcements are considered non-routine announcements. Earnings forecasts are 
                                                 
6 We exclude neutral news earnings forecasts from our testing as it is not clear whether neutrals news earnings 
forecasts are purely neutral or indicating good news or bad news to the capital market. 
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further classified according to their news content (good and bad news), precision (qualitative, 
open-ended, range and point estimates), and timing (horizon). 
Earnings forecasts are classified as good (bad) news if the content reveals favourable 
(unfavourable) earnings prospects relative to the last periodic earnings announcement or the 
last earnings forecasts if one has been provided since the last periodic earnings 
announcement. 
Forecast precision is defined as the level of specificity in the earnings forecasts. We follow 
Baginski et al. (2002) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) by using an ordinal coding scheme where 
precision is coded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range and point estimates, 
respectively). Qualitative forecasts are those where management provides a general 
impression about the expected performance (e.g. “we expect improved earnings performance 
this year”). These qualitative forecasts do not capture any precise numeric interpretation about 
the firms’ expected performance. Open-ended forecasts are forecasts where management 
specifies a lower bound or an upper bound for the expected firm performance (e.g. “profit will 
be greater than $5 million” or “profit will be lower than $2 million”). Range forecasts contain 
a precise numeric range of expected firm performance (e.g. “profit will be between $1.1 and 
$1.3 million”). Point forecasts are the most specific, indicating a precise single numerical 
figure about expected performance (e.g. “net income will be $1.2 million”). 
Forecast horizon captures the timeliness of the earnings forecasts. Assuming forecasts are 
accurate, longer forecast horizon provides investors with information on a timelier basis. 
Baginski et al. (2002) define forecast horizon as the number of calendar days until period end, 
regardless of whether the period is an interim or annual forecasting period. We follow the 
similar procedure and based on the facts that most forecasts in New Zealand relate to current 
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full period earnings, we measure forecast horizon as the number of calendar days between the 
release date of the earnings forecast and the end of the current financial year. 
We follow Hutton and Stocken (2009) in suggesting that prior year’s forecast accuracy would 
enhance the credibility of the current year’s earnings forecasts. 
5.4 Market Reaction to Management Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Announcements 
Cumulative abnormal returns around the release date of the earnings forecasts and earnings 
announcements are used as the measurement of the market reaction to these announcements. 
The abnormal return for each day of the event window is measured using the single factor 
market model with the NZX Top40&50 Index.7 
Prior research reveals inconsistency in the length of event window for cumulative abnormal 
return measurement. Shorter windows fail to fully capture the effects of analyst briefings pre- 
and post-announcements, occasional NZX misspecification of announcement dates and 
delayed reaction to announcements due to the subsequent press coverage or firm press release. 
However, wider event windows create the risk of capturing other event effects, such as the 
weekend effect, that are not related to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. 
Skinner (1994) uses the [0,1] model while Kasznik and Lev (1995) use several different event 
windows including the five day windows. We propose the use of five day window to capture 
the market reaction to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. 
                                                 
7 The NZX Top 40&50 Return Index changed from Top 40 to Top 50 on 28 February 2003. The method advised 
by the NZX to create a continuous series of the NZX Top 40&50 Return Index is as follows. From the 28 
February 2003 up to the present time, the NZX Top50 Return Index is used. From the 28 February 2003 
backward, a news data set based on the previous NZX Top40 Return Index is created by using the following 
formula: 
NZX Top50 Return Index Equivalent = (NZX Top 40 Return Index * NZX Top50 Return Index as on 28 
February 2003)/NZX Top40 Return Index as on 28 February 2003.  
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5.5 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
Our hypotheses are tested using univariate methods and due to the expected interactions 
across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test hypotheses and to control 
for common firm-specific characteristics expected to impact on the market reaction to 
earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. Depending on the results of Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian and Hausman test, we employ the random effects, fixed effects or OLS 
linear regression models where appropriate to make the inferences about the hypothesised 
relationships and to control for forecast-specific and firms-specific characteristics. The 
generic models are depicted as follows. 
CARi,t = a0 + a1REFORMi,t + a2ENEWSi,t + a3NREVENTi,t + a4PRECISEi,t + a5FHORIZONi,t + 
a6PRIOR_INACCURACYi,t + a7ECHANGEi,t + a8SIZEi,t + a9XLISTi,t + a10MVBVi,t  + a11ANALYSTi,t + (ui + εi,t) 
(1) 
EACARi,t = b0 + b1REFORMi,t + b2ECSIGNi,t + b3ECHANGEi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5XLISTi,t + b6MVBVi,t + 
b7ANALYSTi,t + b8PRE-EMPTi,t + (wi + θi,t) 
(2a) 
EACARi,t = c0 + c1REFORMi,t + c2ECSIGNi,t + c3ECHANGEi,t + c4SIZEi,t + c5XLISTi,t + c6MVBVi,t + 
c7ANALYSTi,t + c8ACCURACYi,t + δi,t 
(2b) 
Models 1 and 2a-b are used to test the changes in the market reaction to earnings forecasts 
(H1) and earnings announcements (H2) following the disclosure reform, respectively. The 
definitions of the dependent variables are as follows. 
CAR is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the 
management earnings forecasts. 
EACAR is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the 
earnings announcements. 
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REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure 
reform period or 0 otherwise. 
ENEWS is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast indicates an expected positive 
change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise. 
NREVENT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast is released through a non-
routine announcement and 0 otherwise. 
PRECISE is level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point 
forecasts, respectively. 
FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of earnings forecast and the corresponding 
financial reporting date. 
PRIOR_INACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the last management earnings forecast 
in the previous financial year is inaccurate and 0 if either the last management earnings forecast is accurate or no 
management earnings forecast is made. 
ECSIGN is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change 
and 0 otherwise. 
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by 
share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. 
XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 
otherwise. 
MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the 
current financial year. 
ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the 
corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. 
PRE-EMPT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s change in earnings is 
pre-empted by at least on management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. 
ACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s change in earnings is 
pre-empted by accurate management earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise. 
Model 1 and 2a-b are subsequently retested while including the interaction variables between 
REFORM and either ANALYST or XLIST once at a time to investigate whether such impact of 
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the disclosure reform on the market reaction to earnings forecasts and earnings 
announcements if any is influenced by the alternative sources of earnings-related information 
if available. Model 1 is also retested while including the interaction variables between 
REFORM and either ENEWS or NREVENT to examine whether the forecast news content and 
the forecast announcement type have affected the impact of the disclosure reform on the 
market reaction earnings forecasts if any. Model 2a and 2b are also retested while including 
the interaction variables between REFORM and PRE_EMPT and between REFORM and 
ACCURACY, respectively to inspect whether the impact of the disclosure reform on market 
reaction to earnings announcements is influenced by the firms’ earnings forecast behaviour. 
Skewness and kurtosis statistics for the regression variables are checked and extreme values 
are winsorised to preserve the characteristic of the original data while minimising possible 
distortion of results by the extreme values. The maximum number of observations winsorised 
is limited to 1 percent of the sample observations. 
6 Results 
6.1 Market Reaction to Earnings Forecasts 
Table 2 displays the abnormal returns for the five days encompassing 580 bad news or good 
news management earnings forecasts made by 94 firms during the study period. Consistent 
with prior research, we find that the capital market typically responds negatively to bad news 
and positively to good news and that there is an asymmetrical reaction to bad and good news. 
The mean of cumulative five day abnormal returns for bad news is -5.132 percent compared 
to 1.259 percent for good news earnings forecasts. This asymmetrical treatment of bad news 
and good news still prevailed across the disclosure reform. Although an overall comparison 
between the cumulative five day abnormal returns for routine and non-routine earnings 
forecasts do not reveal any significant difference, the capital market reacted negatively to 
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non-routine earnings forecasts in the pre-disclosure reform period. Overall, the capital market 
reacted positively to earnings forecasts issued by firms not followed by analysts or by firms 
not cross-listed and negatively to earnings forecasts issued by firms followed by analysts or 
by firms cross-listed. Such difference does not seem to be alleviated following the disclosure 
reform. 
Table 3 compares the magnitude of the cumulative five day abnormal returns associated with 
these 580 earnings forecasts across the disclosure reform. Overall, the capital market reacted 
more strongly to bad news earnings forecasts compared to good news earnings forecasts and 
this asymmetrical treatment tended to decrease in the post-disclosure reform period. 
Interestingly, non-routine earnings forecasts consistently proved to have more value relevant 
to the capital market across the disclosure reform. The capital market reacted less strongly to 
firms that are followed by analysts or cross-listed. This trend is more obvious in the post-
disclosure reform period. 
Table 7 presents the results from the random effects and fixed effects linear regression model 
used to test H1. The results from this model being tested with REFORM_ENEWS, 
REFORM_NREVENT, REFORM_ANALYST and REFORM_XLIST once at a time are also 
shown. The REFORM coefficient is not significant; therefore, H1 is supported for the overall 
sample of 580 bad or good news earnings forecasts. The REFORM_NREVENT, 
REFORM_ANALYST, REFORM_XLIST are negatively significant. Therefore, H1 is rejected 
by the group of non-routine earnings forecasts or by the group of earnings forecasts issued by 
firms followed by analysts or cross-listed on a foreign exchange. Further evidence from Table 
7 reveals significant coefficients for some forecast-specific and firm-specific characteristics. 
The ENEWS coefficient is negatively significant, indicating that the capital market overall 
reacted more strongly to bad news earnings forecasts. The positive significant NREVENT 
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coefficient shows that non-routine earnings forecasts are more value relevant to the capital 
market. It is evident from the significant negative PRIOR_ACCURACY coefficient that prior 
years’ forecast accuracy did enhance the credibility of current years’ earnings forecasts. The 
SIZE coefficient is negatively significant shows that the information content of an incremental 
management earnings issued by bigger firms is lower than their smaller counterparts. The 
positive significant XLIST coefficient indicates the earnings forecasts provided by cross-listed 
firms being more value relevant. 
6.2 Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements 
Table 4 shows the abnormal return for the five days encompassing 626 earnings 
announcements in general and 350 pre-empted earnings announcements in particular provided 
by the same 94 firms during the same study period. Overall, the capital market reacted 
negatively to earnings announcements indicating a negative change in earnings performance, 
or to earnings announcements issued by firms not followed by analysts or by firms issuing 
inaccurate earnings forecasts. 
Table 5 compares the magnitude of the cumulative five day abnormal returns associated with 
these 626 earnings announcements in general and 350 pre-empted earnings announcements in 
particular. Our results document a significant reduction in the market reaction to the overall 
earnings announcements, irrespectively whether they are pre-empted by management earnings 
forecasts. The magnitude of the market reaction to earnings announcements significantly 
reduced from 0.058 to 0.043 at 1 percent level of significance. These findings are mainly 
driven by the group of earnings announcements indicating a positive change in earnings 
performance, or by the group of earnings announcements issued by firms which are not 
followed by analysts or not cross-listed on a foreign exchange or provide accurate earnings 
forecasts. 
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Table 8 and 9 provide the results from the random effects and OLS linear regression model 
used to test H2. The results from this model being tested with REFORM_ECSIGN, 
REFORM_ANALYST, REFORM_PRE-EMPT, REFORM_ACCURACY and REFORM_XLIST 
once at a time are also presented. From both Table 8 and 9, the REFORM coefficient is 
negatively significant; therefore H2 is rejected.  From Table 8, the negative significant 
REFORM_ECSIGN coefficient and the positive significant REFORM_ANALYST and 
REFORM_PRE-EMPT coefficients reveal that, H2 is only rejected by the group of earnings 
announcements indicating a positive change in earnings performance or by the group of 
earnings announcements issued by firms which are not followed by analysts or not cross-
listed on a foreign exchange. From Table 9, the REFORM_ACCURACY is marginally 
negative significant, confirming that H2 is marginally rejected by the group of earnings 
announcements pre-empted by accurate earnings forecasts. 
7 Conclusions 
The objective of our study has been (1) to investigate the impact of the New Zealand 
continuous disclosure reform on the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures issued by 
firms and (2) to examine whether any impact of this disclosure reform is influenced by the 
availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information. Focusing first on 
management earnings forecasts, we find only limited evidence of changes that can be linked 
to the disclosure reform. However, there is evidence in the post-disclosure reform period that 
the capital market has placed less emphasis on management earnings forecasts issued by firms 
which are followed by analysts and/or cross-listed on a foreign exchange. These findings 
suggest that the incremental value of each management earnings forecast perceived by 
investors decreased in the post-disclosure reform period when investors could seek 
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information about firms independently from the alternative sources. This is not the case when 
there is a less likelihood of an availability of an alternative source of information. 
Stronger evidence for an impact of the disclosure reform is found in our analysis of the 
market reaction to earnings announcements. The market reaction to earnings announcements 
if found to significantly decrease in the post-disclosure reform period, indicating a significant 
improvement in the information set available to the capital market immediately before the 
release of these mandatory earnings announcements. Interestingly, while we have found the 
reform has diminished the value relevance of earnings announcements, this impact is only 
restricted to firms which are not followed by analysts and/or not cross-listed in a foreign 
exchange. In other words, the relative benefits of this disclosure reform seem to be less when 
there are alternative sources of earnings-related information available in the capital market. 
From an academic perspective, our evidence adds to the current literature body that supports a 
positive impact of the disclosure reform on corporate disclosure behaviour and capital market 
characteristics. However, by investigating the availability of alternative sources of earnings 
related information about firms, we have given a clearer picture of the relative information 
changes for different firms. 
From a regulatory perspective, our evidence could be consistent with the regulators’ intent 
that the disclosure reform has improved the flow of information available in the capital 
market. However, the fact that there is not a positive impact for many firms means that the 
regulators should be aware that the disclosure reform may not bear benefits universally. This 
means that the increase in compliance costs which are borne by all firms could not be justified 
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Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Selecting criteria Number of observations 
Sample Firms  
Total number of firms listed on NZX as on 3 December 2004 197 
Less firms listed on NZX as on 3 December 2004 without IRG data (44) 
Less firms not surviving at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004 (59) 
Total firms in the final sample 94 
Sample Management Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Announcements  
Total financial years by 94 firms 655* 
Less financial years with missing announcements or unusable financial and stock return data 
for the firms 
(29) 
Total financial years/earnings announcements in the final sample 626** 
Total announcements (potentially containing earnings forecasts) in the final sample 2650 
Less announcements not containing earnings forecasts (1930) 
Total announcements containing earnings forecasts in the final sample 720 
Less announcements containing neutral news earnings forecasts 140 
Total announcements containing bad and good news earnings forecasts 580 
* Total financial years including all financial years with financial reporting date ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 
2005. 
** Among 626 financial years (342 pre- and 284 post-disclosure reform), there are 350 financial years (163 pre- and 187 post-




Abnormal Return for the Five Days encompassing 580 Bad and Good News Management Earnings Forecasts Pre- and 
Post-Disclosure Reform 
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^, *, ** The abnormal returns are significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
This table shows the results of the one-sample student t-statistic for the abnormal returns for the five days encompassing 580 
bad and good news management earnings forecasts. A management earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX 
pre-empting a current financial year’s earnings announcement. A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the 
pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 December 
2002. A management earnings forecast is classified as bad (good) news if the forecast indicates an expected negative 
(positive) change in the current year earnings. A management earnings forecast is classified as routine (non-routine) if the 
forecast is released through a routine announcement such as quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary annual, annual reports, 
chairman’s addresses at AGM, letters to shareholders, etc. (non-routine announcement such as profit warning, earnings 
guidance, market update, etc). A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its 
corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. A management earnings forecast is 
classified as being in the cross-listed period if its corresponding firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in its 




Magnitude of Five Day Cumulative Abnormal Return associated with 580 Bad and Good News Management Earnings Forecasts 














All Earnings Forecasts      
Mean 0.057 0.060 0.056 -0.669  
Median 0.035 0.036 0.035  -0.285 
Observations 580 248 332   
Bad News Earnings Forecasts      
Mean 0.076 0.090 0.067 -1.163  
Median 0.040 0.040 0.040  -0.443 
Observations 129 51 78   
Good News Earnings Forecasts      
Mean 0.052 0.052 0.052 -0.002  
Median 0.034 0.034 0.034  -0.206 
Observations 451 197 254   
t-test of difference between means2 -2.429** -1.811* -1.657^   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test2 -2.241* -1.659^ -1.511   
Routine Earnings Forecasts      
Mean 0.050 0.052 0.049 -0.503  
Median 0.034 0.034 0.032  -0.139 
Observations 451 209 242   
Non-routine Earnings Forecasts      
Mean 0.083 0.104 0.074 -1.451^  
Median 0.049 0.064 0.044  -1.477 
Observations 129 39 90   
t-test of difference between means3 3.357** 2.448** 2.415**   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test3 3.559** 3.167** 2.189*   
Not Followed by Analysts      
Mean 0.058 0.053 0.063 1.185  
Median 0.036 0.034 0.040  1.146 
Observations 237 119 118   
Followed by Analysts      
Mean 0.057 0.067 0.051 -1.516^  
Median 0.035 0.039 0.033  -1.205 
Observations 343 129 214   
t-test of difference between means4 -0.145 1.273 -1.568^   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test4 -0.942 0.610 -1.742^   
Not Cross-listed      
Mean 0.058 0.055 0.060 0.824  
Median 0.038 0.037 0.039  0.661 
Observations 410 176 234   
Cross-listed      
Mean 0.056 0.072 0.045 -1.671*  
Median 0.030 0.035 0.028  1.578 
Observations 170 72 98   
t-test of difference between means5 -0.288 1.063 -1.983*   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test5 -2.066* -0.122 -2.606*   
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 1 Showing the t-statistic and 
z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for the pre-disclosure reform and post-
disclosure reform period management earnings forecasts. 2 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the 
magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for bad and good news management earnings forecasts. 3 Showing the t-statistic and z-
statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for routine and non-routine management 
earnings forecasts. 4 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal 
returns for management earnings forecasts released in financial years not followed and followed by analysts. 5 Showing the t-statistic 
and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for management earnings forecasts 
released in financial years not cross-listed and cross-listed. The table is based on 580 bad and good news management earnings forecasts 
made by 94 NZX-listed firms with financial reporting date ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. A management earnings 
forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current financial year’s earnings announcement. A management earnings 
forecast is classified as being in the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before 
(on or after) 1 December 2002. A management earnings forecast is classified as bad (good) news if the forecast indicates an expected 
negative (positive) change in the current year earnings. A management earnings forecast is classified as routine (non-routine) if the 
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forecast is released through a routine announcement such as quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary annual, annual reports, chairman’s 
addresses at AGM, letters to shareholders, etc. (non-routine announcement such as profit warning, earnings guidance, market update, 
etc.). A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at 
least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the cross-listed period if 




Abnormal Return for the Five Days encompassing 626 Earnings Announcements Pre- and Post-Disclosure Reform 
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^, *, ** The abnormal returns are significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
This table shows the results of the one-sample student t-statistic for the abnormal returns for the five days encompassing 626 
earnings announcements. An earnings announcement is a mandatory preliminary financial report made to the NZX before the 
release of the corresponding annual report as required by Listing Rule 10.4. An earnings announcement is classified as being in 
the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 
December 2002. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the period with negative (positive) earnings change if it 
shows a decrease (an increase) in earnings per share. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the period followed by 
analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. An earnings 
announcement is classified as being pre-empted (not pre-empted) if it is pre-empted (not pre-empted) by at least one 
management earnings forecast. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted by inaccurate (accurate) 
management earnings forecasts if the corresponding last management earnings forecast is inaccurate (accurate). An earnings 
announcement is classified as being in the cross-listed period if its corresponding firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in 
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All Earnings Announcements      
Mean 0.051 0.058 0.043 -3.090**  
Median 0.032 0.036 0.028  -3.523** 
Observations 626 342 284   
Negative Earnings Change      
Mean 0.052 0.056 0.049 -0.749  
Median 0.034 0.034 0.032  -0.592 
Observations 247 135 112   
Positive Earnings Change      
Mean 0.050 0.060 0.039 -3.551**  
Median 0.031 0.040 0.026  -3.958** 
Observations 379 207 172   
t-test of difference between means2 -0.434 0.501 -1.666*   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test2 -0.781 0.937 -2.204*   
Not Followed by Analysts      
Mean 0.061 0.071 0.047 -2.530**  
Median 0.032 0.044 0.021  -3.582** 
Observations 279 158 121   
Followed by Analysts      
Mean 0.043 0.047 0.039 -1.440^  
Median 0.032 0.034 0.031  -1.026 
Observations 347 184 163   
t-test of difference between means3 -3.277** -2.979** -1.292^   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test3 0.803 -2.336* 1.430   
Not Pre-empted by Management 
Earnings Forecasts 
     
Mean 0.051 0.056 0.042 -1.637^  
Median 0.030 0.034 0.020  -2.624** 
Observations 276 179 97   
Pre-empted by Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
     
Mean 0.051 0.061 0.043 -2.544**  
Median 0.036 0.041 0.031  -2.914** 
Observations 350 163 187   
t-test of difference between means4 0.074 0.604 0.199   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test4 1.687^ 1.700^ 1.653^   
Inaccurate Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
     
Mean 0.048 0.045 0.052 0.577  
Median 0.033 0.033 0.031  -0.085 
Observations 78 41 37   
Accurate Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
     
Mean 0.052 0.066 0.041 -2.944**  
Median 0.036 0.044 0.031  -3.289** 
Observations 272 122 150   
t-test of difference between means5 0.482 1.476^ -1.011   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test5 0.630 1.568 -0.402   
Not  Cross-listed      
Mean 0.052 0.059 0.043 -2.820**  
Median 0.034 0.041 0.027  -4.046** 
Observations 468 257 211   
Cross-listed      
Mean 0.048 0.055 0.040 1.278  
Median 0.028 0.028 0.031  0.140 
Observations 158 85 73   
t-test of difference between means6 -0.594 -0.392 -0.450   
z-statistic for Wilcoxon rank-sum test6 -1.158 -2.382* 0.981   
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^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 1 Showing the t-statistic 
and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements 
released in the pre-disclosure reform and post-disclosure reform periods. 2 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference 
between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in the negative and 
positive earnings change financial years. 3 Showing the t-statistics and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of 
the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in financial years not followed and followed by analysts. 4 
Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for 
earnings announcements released in financial years not pre-empted and pre-empted by management earnings forecasts. 5 Showing 
the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings 
announcements released in firms years with inaccurate and accurate management earnings forecasts. 6 Showing the t-statistic and z-
statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in 
financial years not cross-listed and cross-listed. The table is based on 626 earnings announcements made by 94 NZX-listed firms 
with financial reporting date ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. An earnings announcement is a mandatory 
preliminary financial report made to the NZX before the release of the corresponding annual report as required by Listing Rule 
10.4. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its 
corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the 
period with negative (positive) earnings change if it shows a decrease (an increase) in earnings per share. An earnings 
announcement is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst 
in its corresponding financial year. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted if it is pre-empted by at least one 
management earnings forecast. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted by inaccurate (accurate) management 
earnings forecasts if the corresponding last management earnings forecast is inaccurate (accurate). An earnings announcement is 





Descriptive Statistics Pre- and Post-Disclosure Reform 
 

















Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all bad and good news management earnings forecasts 
 N = 580 N = 248 N = 332  
CAR -3.468 (-3.344) -3.447 (-3.327) -3.484 (-3.354) -0.375 (-0.280) 
|Earnings Change| 0.189 (0.037) 0.271 (0.046) 0.128 (0.030) -2.518** (-2.843**) 
ECHANGE -3.218 (-3.306) -2.989 (-3.086) -3.388 (-3.515) -2.978** (-2.842**) 
Total Market Value of Equity 
(millions) 
1,393.6 (156.5) 1,429.2 (121.7) 1,367.0 (192.2) -0.118 (2.597**) 
SIZE 19.000 (18.868) 18.810 (18.617) 19.142 (19.074) 2.249* (2.600**) 
MVBV 0.387 (0.380) 0.259 (0.224) 0.482 (0.424) 3.721** (3.366**) 
ENEWS (good news) 451 (77.76%) 197 (79.44%) 254 (76.51%) 0.704 
NREVENT 129 (22.24%) 39 (15.73%) 90 (27.11%) 10.635** 
PRECISE (qualitative) 334 (57.59%) 181 (72.98%) 153 (46.08%) 45.942** 
PRECISE (open-ended) 60 (10.34%) 21 (8.47%) 39 (11.75%)  
PRECISE (range) 58 (10.00%) 10 (4.03%) 48 (14.46%)  
PRECISE (point) 128 (22.07%) 36 (14.52%) 92 (27.71%)  
FHORIZON 194 (213) 205 (221) 186 (189) -2.317* (-1.744^) 
PRIOR_INACCURACY 
(inaccurate) 
88 (15.17%) 38 (15.32%) 50 (15.06%) 0.008 
ANALYST (followed by analysts) 343 (59.14%) 129 (52.02%) 214 (64.46%) 9.094** 
XLIST (cross-listed) 170 (29.31%) 72 (29.03%) 98 (29.52%) 0.016 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for all earnings announcements 
 N = 626 N = 342 N = 284  
EACAR -3.555 (-3.429) -3.413 (-3.325) -3.727 (-3.595) -3.530** (-3.520**) 
|Earnings Change| 0.178 (0.037) 0.209 (0.040) 0.141 (0.032) -1.588^ (-1.077) 
ECHANGE -3.315 (-3.293) -3.239 (-3.214) -3.406 (-3.449) 1.223 (1.070) 
Total Market Value of Equity 
(millions) 
1,774.8 (130.3) 1,921.1 (107.2) 1,598.6 (176.1) -0.408 (2.456*) 
SIZE 18.720 (18.685) 18.658 (18.491) 18.903 (18.987) 2.083* (2.457*) 
MVBV 0.373 (0.254) 0.290 (0.164) 0.472 (0.356) 2.850** (2.954**) 
ANALYST (followed by analysts) 347 (55.43%) 184 (53.80%) 163 (57.39%) 0.811 
XLIST (cross-listed) 158 (25.24%) 85 (24.85%) 73 (25.70%) 0.060 
PRE-EMPT (pre-empted) 350 (55.91%) 163 (39.77%) 187 (65.85%) 20.813** 
ACCURACY (accurate) (350 
pre-empted earnings 
announcements) 
272 (77.71%) 122 (74.85%) 150 (80.21%) 1.449 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). The pre-disclosure 
reform period includes all financial years ending in the 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002 period and the post-disclosure 
reform period includes all those ending in the 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005 period. |Earnings Change| is the 
absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at 
the beginning of the financial year. Total Market Value of Equity is the total market value of equity at the end of the current 
financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. MVBV is 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year. 
ENEWS is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive 
change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. NREVENT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if management 
earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. PRECISE is level of forecast precision, 
coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. FHORIZON is the number of 
calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the corresponding financial year. 
PRIOR_INACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the last management earnings forecast in the previous 
financial year is inaccurate and 0 if either the last management earnings forecast is accurate or no management earnings 
forecast is made. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the 
corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed 
on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. ACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial 




Factors Associated with Magnitude of Five Day Abnormal Return for 580 Bad and Good News Management Earnings 
Forecasts Pre- and Post-Disclosure Reform 
 
CARi,t = a0 + a1REFORMi,t + a2ENEWSi,t + a3NREVENTi,t + a4PRECISEi,t + a5FHORIZONi,t + a6PRIOR_INACCURACYi,t 











































































































































































































Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier Test 
 6.020* 5.940* 5.570* 7.310** 7.330** 
Hausman Test  14.580 14.310 15.910 15.740 37.320** 
Model Chi-square  36.420** 36.040** 39.950** 41.590**  
Model F-value      2.600** 
Sigma_u  0.303 0.312 0.290 0.277 0.842 
Sigma_e  1.105 1.106 1.104 1.102 1.097 
Rho  0.070 0.074 0.065 0.060 0.371 
F test      1.620** 
R2  0.076 0.076 0.082 0.081 0.001 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Random effects and fixed effects linear regression models are used where the dependent variable is CAR, the 
natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the management earnings forecasts. 
REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform 
period or 0 otherwise. ENEWS is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast indicates an expected 
positive change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise. NREVENT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the 
earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. PRECISE is level of forecast precision, 
coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. FHORIZON is the number of 
calendar days between the release date of earnings forecast and the corresponding financial reporting date. 
PRIOR_INACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the last management earnings forecast in the 
previous financial year is inaccurate and 0 if either the last management earnings forecast is accurate or no management 
earnings forecast is made. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per 
share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of 
equity at the end of the current financial year. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed 
on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity at the end of the current financial year. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is 
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followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. REFORM_ENEWS is REFORM 
multiplied by ENEWS. REFORM_NREVENT is REFORM multiplied by NREVENT. REFORM_ANALYST is REFORM 




Factors Associated with Magnitude of Five Day Abnormal Return for 626 Earnings Announcements Pre- and Post- 
Disclosure Reform 
 
EACARi,t = b0 + b1REFORMi,t + b2ECSIGNi,t + b3ECHANGEi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5XLISTi,t + b6MVBVi,t + b7ANALYSTi,t + 






































































































































































      
0.413 
(0.035*) 









Hausman Test  5.300 5.960 5.210 6.100 5.890 
Model Chi-square  22.940** 26.970** 26.950** 22.930** 27.480** 
Sigma_u  0.326 0.323 0.332 0.325 0.332 
Sigma_e  1.057 1.055 1.054 1.058 1.053 
Rho  0.087 0.086 0.090 0.086 0.090 
R2  0.038 0.045 0.043 0.038 0.044 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Random effects linear regression model is used where dependent variable is EACAR, the natural logarithm of the 
absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the earnings announcements. REFORM is a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform period or 0 otherwise. ECSIGN is 
a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. 
ECHANGE is a natural logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price 
at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the 
current financial year. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange 
and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end 
of the current financial year. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one 
analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. PRE-EMPT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the 
current financial year’s change in earnings is pre-empted by at least on management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. 
REFORM_ECSIGN is REFORM multiplied by ECSIGN. REFORM_ANALYST is REFORM multiplied by ANALYST. 




Factors Associated with Magnitude of Five Day Abnormal Return for 350 Pre-empted Earnings Announcements Pre- 
and Post- Disclosure Reform 
 
EACARi,t = c0 + c1REFORMi,t + c2ECSIGNi,t + c3ECHANGEi,t + c4SIZEi,t + c5XLISTi,t + c6MVBVi,t + c7ANALYSTi,t + 
































































































































































      
0.484 
(0.078^) 




0.780 1.320 0.860 0.810 0.630 
Adjusted R2  0.027 0.029 0.028 0.032 0.033 
F-value  2.210* 2.170* 2.090* 2.280* 2.320* 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Linear regression model is used where dependent variable is EACAR, the natural logarithm of the absolute value 
of the five day abnormal return associated with the earnings announcements. REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the 
value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform period or 0 otherwise. ECSIGN is a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is a natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the 
financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. XLIST 
is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year. 
ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding 
financial year and 0 otherwise. ACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s 
change in earnings is pre-empted by accurate management earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise. REFORM_ECSIGN is 
REFORM multiplied by ECSIGN. REFORM_ANALYST is REFORM multiplied by ANALYST. REFORM_ACCURACY is 
REFORM multiplied by ACCURACY. REFORM_XLIST is REFORM multiplied by XLIST. 
 
 
